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In the Supreme Court· 
of the State of Utah 
CHIEF CONSOLIDATE MINING COMPANY, Case No. 7323 
vs. Ap pel/ant, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondellt. 
PARK LTTAH CONSOLIDATED MINING 
COMPANY, 
vs. Appellant, 
SUMMIT COUNTY, et al, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 7334 
SILVER KING COALITION MINING Case No. 7332 
vs. Appellant, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
UNITED STATES SMELTING REFINING AND Case No. 7324 
MINING COMPANY, 
vs. Appellant, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al, 
Respondent. 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, Case No. 7297 
vs. AppellaJZt, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 1 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in the Appellant's Brief is sub-
stantially correct in stating the contentions and allegations 
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of the various appellants as set forth in their· complaints and j) 
amended complaints. Such statement of facts is therefore ac- j 
cepted except as it may be augmented to some extent through-
out the argument in this brief by reference to the pleadings 
in the cases and by referring more fully to matters in the ~~H 
pleadings not covered in the statement of facts of the appellants. ~.11. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellants have set forth their arguments under 
four subdivisions numbered one to four, the latter having sub-
headings (a), (b), and (c). We believe that all of these 
arguments can conveniently and effectively be met under the 
following headings: 
1. The Subsidy Payments Under the Premium Price Pbn 
were Properly Included in the Basis for Determining the Mi!1c 
Occupation Tax. 
2. The Subsidy Payments Under the Premium Price Plan 
were Properly Included in Determining Gross Proceeds and 
Thereby Fixing the Assessed Value of the Mines. 
(a) The inclusion of payments under the premium price 
plan in the Net Proceeds Tax Base would not be 
unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE SUBSIDY PAYMENTS UNDER THE PREMIUM 
PRICE PLAN WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE 
4 
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BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE MINE OCCUPATION 
TAX. 
One of the arguments set forth by the appellants is that 
the premium price plan was "an outright subsidy arrange-
ment." We do not believe it makes any difference by wh'.tt 
name the payments are designated which were made und~r 
the premium price plan. If, however, by this argument appel-
lants mean to indicate that such payments were outright gifts 
to the mining company and had no relationship whatsoevt!r 
to the price paid for the ore or metals or to the value thereof 
and could therefore not be considered in any manner in arriv-
ing at a proper tax base in connection with the taxes to be 
assessed against the mining companies then such argument 
is absurd. 
In Appellants' Brief they set forth under Argument 1, in 
great detail excerpts from a report made by the Metals Re-
serve Company to a committee of Congress. In view of the 
fact that these cases are before this court on judgments of 
dismissals entered after the court had sustained demurrers 
to the complaints and amended complaints and after appellants 
had declined to amend further their complaints, it seems 
to us improper to endeavor to bring into the record such 
extraneous matters as reports of the Metals Reserve Company 
to a Congressional committee. It is our understanding that 
under such circumstances the cases will be decided by this 
court upon the pleadings as filed in the court below and the 
rulings of the court thereon. If the report to the Congressional 
committee had been introduced or an attempt made to intro-
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duce the same at a trial it would have been inadmissible as 
hearsay and surely in a case brought to this court on an appeal 
from an order sustaining a demurrer and a subsequent order 
dismussing the complaint there is no place for such a report. 
Nevertheless, let us examine here just briefly what the 
situation is with regard to the nature of these payments. The 
very title of the plan is significant in showing that the amounts 
paid thereunder were to be and were a part of the price of the 
ore or metals produced. It was called the "premium price 
plan." The pleadings in these cases, and particularly the 
amended complaint in the Kennecott case, bring the ca5es 
right in line with the statement of Mr. Justice Wolfe in his 
concurring opinion in Combined Metals Reduction Co. et al. 
vs. State Tax Commission et al., 176 P. (2d) 614, wherein he 
states: 
"That the so-called subsidy was in fact considered as 
an additional price for the metal in the ore is borne 
out by the fact that at first it was announced that the 
Metals Reserve Company would pay as an overall 
price, the ceiling plus the premium prices for domestic 
ores where production exceeded quotas which were to 
be fixed. But under the Emergency Price Control Act 
the Metals Reserve Company could not sell for any 
more than the maximum price established. Hence, if 
the Metals Reserve Company had paid respectively 
17c for copper, llc for lead and 9Vtic for zinc, it would 
have been required to have them smelted on a toll 
basis and then sold to the fabricator for 12c, 61f2c and 
81Ac per pound respectively for copper, lead and zinc. 
While the ultimate outlay to the Government would 
have been substantially the same, it was simpler to 
have the mills or smelters pay only ceiling prices for 
the· metals, the Metals Reserve Company paying the 
6 
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producer the premiwn price if applicable. But eveQ 
this method required a change in the regulation of 
the Office of Price Administration in May, 1942. This 
was immediately after setting up the 'premium price 
plan.' The change in the regulation required sales 
of copper, lead and zinc or ores containing such 
metals to smelters at ceiling prices, but permitted 
Metals Reserve Company 'pursuant to the premium 
price plan announced by the Federal Loan Agency, the 
War Production Board and the Office of Price Ad-
ministration,' to pay the premium price or subsidy 
and provided it 'should exempt from the maximum 
regulations'. There should be little doubt then that 
the extra amount paid for metal in over-quota ores 
is part of a price." 
These so-called subsidy payments were certainly not out-
right gifts. The Appellants themselves state that the payments 
were made for over-quota production and if they failed to 
meet their quota no payments were made by Metals Reserve 
Company. A real, tangible and valuable consideration existed 
for the subsidy payments. As was stated in the case of Helver-
ingvs. Clairborne-Annapolis ferry Co. (CCA 4th) 93 Fed. 2d 
875: 
"Bounties granted by a government are never pure 
donations but are allowed either in consideration of 
services rendered or to be rendered, objects of pubLic 
interest to be obtained, production or manufacture to 
be stimulated, or moral obligations to be recognized." 
See also Allen vs. Smith, 173 U.S. 389, 402; 19 Sup. Ct. 446, 451; 
43 L. Ed. 741; also Baboquivari Cattle Co. vs. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue (CCA 9th) 135 Fed. (2d) 114. 
It is our contention that the reasoning and rules laid 
down by this court in Combined Metals Reduction, Co. vs. 
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State Tax Commission, supra, apply and are controUing in 
connection with the cases here involving the occupation tax. 
The contention of the Appellants is, however, that such case 
is not controlling and has no bearing on this matter now before 
~he court. Appellants' contention i~ based upon the fact that 
tne· court stated therein: 
"We base our conclusion that premium payments were 
made for ores sold and not for the mere production 
of such ores upon part of a joint statement issued in 
February, 1942, by the War Produciton Board and 
the Office of Price Administration, wherein it is stated: 
'Premium payments will be based upon metal paid 
for under the terms of settlement contracts. Quotas, 
of course, will be fixed on the same basis. If no settle-
ment contracts exist, quotas and premium payments 
will be computed on the basis of 95, 90 and 85 per 
cent of the metal content, in the case of copper, lead 
and zinc, respectively .. .' It is self-evident that metals 
are not paid for under settlement contracts unless such 
metals are sold. (Italics added). 
"Since it appears that the 'premium prices' paid to 
the mining companies are for metals sold by them, 
and since our occupation tax statute provides that the 
basis for determining the amount of taxes due where 
there has been a sale of metals under a bona fide 
contract of sale is 'the amount of money or its equiv-
alent actually received . . . from the sale . . . ' it is 
our opinion that the lower court erred in holding that 
the 'premium payments' received from the Metals 
Reserve Company should not have been included by 
the Tax Commission in determining the amounts due." 
Appellants' contention is that the statement referred to 
by the court in the above quotation was that contained in ori-
ginal Rule 13, which rule was subsequently amended. The 
8 
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con~ention is further made that inasmuch as the Appellants. 
allege in their complaints in the said cases that the amended 
Rule 13 provided that subsidy payments would be based on 
certain stated percentages for respective metals regardless of 
the percentages of the metals actually recovered or paid for 
under mine-smelter contracts or mill-smelter contracts or mine-
mill contracts, and that they further alleged that such amended 
Rule 13 did not require as a condition of payment of subsidies 
that the ores be sold on account of the production of whi-:h 
such bonuses were payable, that we must conclude that the 
payment of the subsidies had no relationship to the sale of 
the ore or metals produced. 
Such a conclusion cannot be properly drawn. The alle-
gation in the complaint as amended to the effect that the 
amounts received as subsidies from Metals Reserve Compa3y 
were not amounts received by plaintiff from the sal_e of suet! 
ores nor the gross value thereof are certainly nothing but con-
clusions of law. This is the very question at issue - the very 
legal conclusion to be determined. Where the complaint sets 
forth various facts in regard to methods of procedure, this 
court will determine from such facts the ultimate legal con-
clusion as to whether or not amounts received. by the plaintiff 
from Metals Reserve Company were or were not received from 
the sale of such ores or the gross value thereof. Hence, the 
allegations in the complaint with regard thereto, being con-
clusions of lavv, are not binding upon the defendants and re-
spondents herein and were not admitted by their demurrers, 
since the demurrers admit only facts well pleaded and not 
conclusions of law. 
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The original Rule 13, to which this court referred in its 
decision in the occupation tax cases, recognized that the ores 
and metals mined by the various companies were in ordinary 
course delivered to smelters or mills in connection with the 
sale thereof of the ores or metals and further recognized that 
in connection with most such transactions there were involved 
and in existence settlement contracts. That original Rule 13, 
however, further recognized that in some cases no settlement 
contracts exist and provided for a method of computing pre-
mium payments in such instances. In connection with the 
amended Rule 13, there is nothing to indicate that the premium 
payments were thenceforth to be made for any different pur-
pose than had been made under the original Rule 13. In fact, 
the amended rules explicitly state that the purpose of changing 
Rule 13 was to place premium payments on a uniform basis 
and to simplify the administration of the program. Such chang~ 
in procedure, however, did not alter the basic facts that such 
premium payments were still, as they had been before, a dehn-
ite and integral part of the price paid for such metals or ores 
in· connection with the sale thereof. Throughout the entire 
program, both before Rule 13 was amended and afterw1rd, 
the premium payments were made as a part of the actual tot:J.l 
price authorized and pursuant to the premium price plan in-
augurated jointly by the Federal Loan Agency, the War Pro-
duction Board and the Office of Price Administration. In other 
words, utider 0. P. A. regulations made in conjunction with 
the'War Production Board the prices permitted to be paid for 
the metals were the ceiling prices plus the premium price. 
And· the two of them together constituted the selling price of 
the:· ores and metals~ The one .was never divorced from the 
10 
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other. We submit that the ruling of this court in the case of 
Combined Metals Reduction Co. vs. State Tax Commission, 
supra, is binding and controlling in the occupation tax cases 
here before this court, namely, Chief Consolidated Mining Co. 
vs. State Tax Commission, Silver King Coalition Mining Co. 
vs. State Tax Commission and Kennecott Copper Corporation 
vs. State Tax Commission, and that the order of the court 
below sustaining the demurrers of the defendants in each 
such case and the judgment dismissing the complaints as 
amended in each of such cases should be sustained. 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION CASE 
The Kennecott Copper Corporation has submitted a sep-
arate brief with regard to its particular case and has pointed 
out one additional factor which it contends differentiates the 
situation in Kennecott from the other cases and upon which 
it contends there is proper basis for reversal of the ruling 
of the court below. The allegations in the Kennecott amended 
complaint are in part, 
" * * * but said subsidies are nevertheless paid 
by said Metals Reserve Company without regard ro 
date or fact of sale, are not computed on the refined 
metal produced or the sales prices thereof, and the 
refined metal is plaintiffs' ultimate product and plain-
tiffs' only product that is sold or that is commercial 
in character." (Kennecott Record 23). 
With regard to such allegations we submit again that 
they are conclusions of law-a legal conclusion as to the very 
question to be determined by these actions. 
Furthermore, the pleadings of the Appellant, Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, must be taken as a whole and considered 
11 
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as one unit. When so taken, such pleadings do not bear out 
the theory .and contentions of Appellant as to the nature, 
purpose, and method of payment of the premium price monie5. 
The amended complaint refers to a copy of the agreement 
under which said subsidies were paid the plaintiff and the 
form of the affidavit periodically submitted by plaintiff in con-
nection with which said subsidy payments were made, said 
agreement and affidavit being marked exhibit "A" and made 
a part of the amended complaint. Although the complaint 
alleges that the payments were made without regard to the 
date or fact of sale (Kennecott Record 23), it is significant 
to note from the affidavit referred to as part of exhibit "A' 
attached to said amended complaint that the portion thereof 
entitled "Receipt from Producer" reads as follows: 
"This is to certify to the Metals Reserve Company 
that the undersigned has received from the American 
Smelting and Refining Company, as agent for Metals 
Reserve Company, $623,700,091.30 as a premium on 
12,475,826 pounds of copper * * * delivered and 
sold in excess of (his) (its) monthly production quota 
as stated in the above affidavit." (Kennecott Record 
30). 
Inasmuch as the Kennecott Copper Company in its com-
plaint alleges that such affidavit and the receipt attached thereto 
were the ones customarily used by it, and inasmuch as the 
producer, the Kennecott Copper Corporation, signed such 
receipt and by such receipt stated that it had received certain 
payments on account of copper delivered and sold, we certainly 
must conclude that the premium payments made to Kennecott 
Copper Corporation did have some relationship to the sale of 
.the. ore. or. metals. 
12 
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ARGUMENT II 
THE SUBSIDY PAYMENTS UNDER THE PREMIUM 
PRICE PLAN WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN DETER-
MINING GROSS PROCEEDS AND THEREBY FIXING 
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE MINES. 
It seems very clear that the two net proceeds tax cases 
here involved, namely, Park Utah Consolidated Mining Com-
pany vs. Summit County and United States Smelting, Refining 
and Mining Company vs. Salt Lake County, fall squarely 
within the ruling and reasoning 9f this court in the case of 
United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Company vs. 
Haynes, 176 P. (2d) 622, which we will refer to hereinafter as 
the Haynes case. The Appellants seek to distinguish the present 
cases from the Haynes case, claiming that in these cases it is 
shown that there was not either a sale of ores or metals or a 
conversion of ores or metals into money or the equivalent of 
money. 
What has been said with regard to the occupation tax 
cases on the matter of a sale of the ores applies with equal 
force to the net proceeds cases. It is not necessary, however, 
to rely upon the matter of a sale of the ores or the metals in 
connection with these net proceeds cases. In the Haynes case, 
supra, the court recognized that under the provisions of Sec-
tion 80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated 1943, proceeds realized 
in addition to those from a sale of the ores or the metals, from 
"a conversion of ores or metals into money or the equivalent 
of money" should properly be considered in arriving at the 
tax base. Under the Utah Statutes the base for determining 
the taxes from mines includes what is annually realized from 
13 
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the product of the mine, over and above the cost of expenses 
of obtaining such proceeds and includes the value of the ore, 
etc., produced but not sold during the year. Mercur Mining & 
Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382; Tintic Standard 
lviin. Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491,497, 15 P.(2d) 633; Sait 
Lake County v. Utah Copper Co., 294 Fed. 199, 264 U.S. 590, 
68 L. Ed. 864, 44 Sup. Ct. 403; 267 U.S. 610, 69 L. Ed. 813, 
45 Sup. Ct. 461. The Appellants contend that by reason of the 
allegations contained in the second amendment to Amended 
·Complaint and numbered paragraph lOa (Record 31, Case 
7334), that the present cases do not come within the rule 
laid down by this court in the Haynes case heretofore decided 
and above cited. That allegation was as follows: 
"Monthly production quotas were computed and pre-
miums were paid on the basis of the percentage of 
the total metal contents of the qualified materials 
in the ores from time to time specified under Amended 
Rule 13 of the Quota Committee, and for the purpose 
of determining the amount of premiums payable, such 
total metal contents were determined by sampling and 
assaying before any conversion of the ores and before 
any processing of the ores other than such crushing 
as is required to per!Jlit of sampling for assaying." 
(Italics added). 
Appellants argue that for the purpose of the present 
proceeding the allegation of the complaint must be accepted 
as correct and hence we must accept as true the statement thJ.t 
the payment of premium prices was not conditioned upon a 
sale of the ores nor upon their conversion into money or the 
equivalent of money. 
We respectfully submit that the allegation that such tot-:tl 
14 
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metal contents were determined "before any conversion of the 
ores" is a conclusion of law. The very question to be deter-
mined would be as to whether or not there was a conversion 
of the ores into money or the equivalent of money. Being a 
conclusion of law, such allegation would not be admitted by 
the demurrer because it would not be a fact well pleaded. 
We particularly call the attention of the court to the 
language used by this court in the Haynes case, wherein the 
court stated: 
"Are the 'premium payments' money received from 
a sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of 
ores extracted from the mine or mining claim? Th~1t 
the 'premium payments' are tied tight to ores extracted 
from a mining claim is not disputed, nor could it well 
be. These payments are made only on metals pro-
duced from a mine or mining claim over the assigned 
quota. But the statute confines the tax base to pro-
ceeds realized from: (a) a sale of ores or metals; 
(b) a conversion of ores or metals into money or the 
equivalent of money. We consider them in the reverse 
order. 
"(2,3) Premium payments apply only to ores shipped 
to the smelter or reduction works. They are made on 
the basis of the determined metal content of the pre-
cipitates and concentrates delivered to the smelting 
company. In other words, the premium payments ue 
made only on and when the ores extracted from the 
mine are converted into concentrates or bullion where 
the quantity of the various metals is readily determin-
able and the value thereof easily computable. When 
the extracted ores have been converted or refined into 
metals in such form that they have a ready market at 
definite or readily determinable prices so that at any 
time the miner can dispose of them and receive the 
15 
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money therefor, they have ·been converted into the: 
equivalent of money, and are to be included in the 
computation of gross proceeds for the purpose of fix-
ing valuation or tax base. Salt Lake County v. Utah 
Copper Co., 10 Cir., 93 F. ( 2d) 127 (certiorari denied 
303 U.S. 652, 58 S. Ct. 750, 82 L. Ed. 1112). See also 
Sec. 80-5-59, U.C.A. 1943; Mercur Gold Mining & Mill 
Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382. But in fixing the 
value or monetary equivalent of the refined metals 
bullion or concentrates for determination of the gross 
proceeds, are the premium payments to be included 
as part of the proceeds realized from ores extracted 
from the mine? There can be no question but that 
these premium payments accrue to the miner from 
the converting, or rendering, into a marketable con-
dition (the equivalent of money) of ores extracted 
from the mine. They are therefore 'proceeds realized' 
from ores extracted from such mine. And since the 
tax base or valuation is fixed from the gross, total or 
whole proceeds so accruing, these payments must be 
included in computing the gross proceeds realized." 
Even if we accept the theory and argument of the Ap-
pellants that in connection with these net proceeds cases the 
payment of the premium payments had no relationship what-
soever to any sale (which, of course, we do not admit), never-
theless even under that theory amended Rule 13 to which the 
Appellants refer and which is made a part of their complaint 
ii1 these cases, provided that the premium payments should 
be made on the basis of ore sent to the mills or smelter, or 
reduction plants. The mining companies did not have to wait 
for a determination of the exact metal content but the amount 
of the premium payment was fixed by a formula. So that ;tt 
the very instant such ores were sent to the smelter they had 
a·· very definite fixed value, namely, the ceiling price plus (in 
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the case of over-quota ores) the premium payment which. irri:; 
mediately became due thereon, based upon the formula. 
The premium in connection with the net proceeds ·cases 
here, falls squarely within the rule laid down in the Haynes 
case, without regard to the question of whether or not such 
funds were realized from a sale of the ores or metals. When 
the ores were taken out of the mine and were sent to the 
smelter or to the mill, such ores immediately had a value in 
addition to their ceiling price, namely the amount which was 
payable for such ores as premium payments. What difference 
could it possibly make that for purposes of uniformity the 
premium price was based on a formula rather than an actur1l 
assay of the metal content? The premium payments were 
received on account of and for said ore. How could any 
fair minded person state that such payments were not received 
in connection with 1. conversion of the ores or metals into 
money or the equivalent of money? Such payments repre-
sented a definite part of the value,-yes, a part of the price 
paid for-the ores. Certainly, as stated by the court in the 
Haynes case, such proceeds received as premium payments 
were "proceeds realized" from ores extracted from the mind. 
It will be observed that in Appellant's brief they refe-~ 
particularly to the situation of Park Utah Consolidated Mines 
Co., and endeavor from that to show that because of th~ 
nature of the payments made to Park Utah they could not have 
any relationship to the ores and could not have been proceed~ 
realized from the sale or conversion into money or its equiva-
lent of the ores. We believe that the argument presented by 
them proves just the contrary. It will be observed that eve~1 
17 
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though the quotas of this company '·ere changed from time 
to time beta use of· alleged representations ·by the company 
that the quotas were not sufficient to permit operation due to 
excessive costs in connection with unwatering of the mine and 
other projects, nevertheless it still appears affirmatively that 
where there was no production, that is, when there was no ore 
~aken from the mine that there were no premium payments 
due or payable, but when ores were taken from the mine 
tinder the zero quota, premium payments became immediately 
due upon the ore so produced and when the other quotas were 
established and ore in excess of such quotas was taken from 
the mine and produced then there became due upon the ore 
so produced premium payments. Such premium payments 
certainly were proceeds realized from the s~le or conversion 
into money or its equivalent of the ores. They certainly had a 
very definite fixed relationship to the ores and were a part of 
the value and price paid for the ores. In this connection it is 
interesting to note that under the pleadings and theory of 
the Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co., it seeks to exclude 
from "gross proceeds" the premium payments but insists on 
ded~cting. from the gross proceeds, without premium payments 
included, all the costs involved in mining, extracting and 
smelting the metalic ores on which the premium payments 
were made. Referring to the figures in its complaint, it re-
ceived from International Smelting and Refining Co. anJ 
American Smelting and Refining Company cash under bona 
fide contracts of sale of its ores in the amount of $820,295.32. 
(Park Utah Record 1 0). It likewise, however, received as 
p'reinium payments in connection with the production of said 
ores a· 'sum of :$536,991.38. · But the mining company sought 
18 
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to deduct the cost of producing said ore as permitted by sec-
tion 80-5-57 U.C.A. 1943, only from the amount received from 
the smelting and refining companies (without including pre-
mium payments) and in doing so stated that such costs ex-· 
ceeded the amount so received. The companies contended 
that the amount received as premium payments should not 
have been included and considered. On this basis they con-
tended that there were no net proceeds. In other words, they 
choose to charge off the cost of production against the taxable 
value of such ore produced but do not wish to include as a 
part of that taxable value an amount actually received for 
the production of the ore and which certainly amounted to 
and was a part of the value of the ore. It is interesting to 
note that such a situation was commented upon by this court 
in the Haynes case, supra, the court therein indicating that 
the inclusion of the premium payments would tend to equalize 
and render uniform the tax base and the assessment. 
ARGUMENT Ila 
THE INCLUSION OF PAYMENTS UNDER THE PRE-
MIUM PRICE PLAN IN THE NET PROCEEDS TAX 
BASE WOULD NOT BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
It is the contention of Appellants that the inclusion of 
subsidies in the net proceeds tax base would be unc?nstitu-
tional as in contravention of sections 2 and 3 of article XIII 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah and also section 2 
of Article I and section 24 of Article I of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. All of said sections relate to unif()rmity 
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m connection w1th the assessment and taxation of tangible 
personal property and to the rights of the people to equal 
protection of the laws and uniformity in operation of the 
laws. These same contentions were made in the Haynes ca~e, 
supra. The contentions were clearly and ably disposed of 
in the opinion of the court in that case, the court holding that 
there was no valid constitutional objection, either state or 
federal to the computation of the tax base as used by the Tax 
Commission and that the inclusion of subsidies in the net 
proceeds tax base was entirely constitutional. In that case 
this court, after argument of the case, requested that counsel 
submit a supplemental brief on the constitutional questions. A 
rather lengthy brief was prepared and filed by counsel for the 
defendant, Haynes, County Treasurer of Tooele County, bearing 
up6ri this question. In view of the fact that the matter was 
thoroughly presented and considered in the Haynes case and 
since the court adopted the theory of the defendants in that 
case and held that there was no constitutional objection to 
the inclusion of such subsidies in the net proceeds tax base; 
and sjnce we feel that the holding of the court in the Haynes 
case is in point and binding with regard to that matter, we 
have not thought it either necessary or proper to burden the 
court with other arguments or citations with regard to su~h 
point in connection with the present cases. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the premium 
price payments were definitely tied into and were a part of the 
sale price· of the ores received by -the mining companies for 
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the ores or metals sold under bona fide contracts of sale, and 
were properly included in fixing the occupation taxes; that 
such premium price payments were without question a part 
of the gross proceeds realized from the sale or conversion into 
rnoney or its equivalent of ores from the mines and therefore 
properly to be considered in connection with fixing the net 
proceeds tax; and that there is no constitutional objection to 
the inclusion of said premium payments in computing either 
the occupation tax or the net proceeds tax. 
By stipulation these five cases have been consolidated for 
the purpose of briefing and argument but separate decisions 
should be rendered in connection with each case in view of the 
different statutes involved in the occupation tax cases and the 
net proceeds tax cases. 
We respectfully submit that the ruling and judgment of 
the court below in each case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
]. LAMBERT GIBSON 
Deputy Attorney Generctl 
ZAR E. HAYES 
Special Assistant Attorney Gener~tl 
P. H. NEELEY 
Summit County Attorney 
EDWARD M. MORRISSEY 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
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